Trojan Horse: DOGE Mass Layoffs Have Led to the Greatest Counterintelligence Threat in Western History
By: E.C. Browne
The concept of MICE - Money, Ideology, Compromise (or Coercion), and Ego - has long been a central framework for explaining why individuals commit espionage. Within the US Intelligence Community (IC), it remains a cornerstone of counterintelligence (CI) training. Each element in MICE offers a pathway for foreign intelligence services (FIS) to lure otherwise loyal citizens into betraying their country. The current wave of mass layoffs, spearheaded by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) across multiple US government agencies and contractors, has created precisely the kind of instability adversaries look to exploit. Although cutting federal expenditures is a legitimate goal, the reckless manner in which DOGE has carried out these layoffs, coupled with rapidly increasing cost of living in the US poses significant risks to both national and global security.
A major concern is the sheer scope of workforce reductions across the defense, justice, homeland security, intelligence, and diplomatic sectors. From the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security to USAID (United States Agency for International Development) to components of the Department of Defense (DoD), tens of thousands of civil servants and contractors have been terminated with little to no warning. Reorganizations of this nature occurred in the 1970s and the 1990s, but the current round differs in the way it rushes crucial decisions without the level of thoroughness typically involved in such large-scale downsizing. In intelligence work, due diligence includes vigorous security protocols for employees upon departure, detailed debriefings, and systematic revocation of clearances. These steps are critical because laid-off personnel, previously entrusted with sensitive or classified information, become prime targets for hostile foreign intelligence services.
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) across the IC emphasize OPSEC (operational security), which mandates a clear reminder of legal and ethical obligations to keep secrets, the retrieval of all government-issued devices, and the immediate deactivation of classified system access. Yet DOGE has not consistently applied these measures. The abruptness of these firings has already produced confusion in high-stakes offices, such as those responsible for nuclear security, where entire teams have been dismissed, then partially rehired once it was discovered that their duties were indispensable. Such rapid changes and oversights are symptomatic of poor coordination.
Another critical issue is the level of access granted to DOGE’s “efficiency engineers,” who have extensively reviewed sensitive government databases. Many people assume “read-only” credentials for certain data sets would suffice, but intelligence agencies often interweave administrative details and clandestine information in the same files. Granting both read and write privileges to outside personnel, some of whom may not have undergone comprehensive background checks, creates avenues for tampering with official records. This free rein in databases endangers chain-of-custody procedures; a single malicious act - like erasing a legitimate employee’s data or adding a fictitious one - could open the door to manipulations that benefit adversarial states.
These vulnerabilities highlight the broader threat of insider risk. Notorious examples such as Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Robert Hanssen (FBI) illustrate the profound damage that a single individual can inflict if they betray their employer. Both spies undermined US national security in part because they felt financially constrained and realized the value of the secrets they held. Today’s highly uncertain economic environment, coupled with the sudden loss of employment, drastically heightens the “Money” factor in MICE. Typically, agencies offset this risk by offering job placement assistance, counseling, or other support to departing personnel. Unfortunately, DOGE’s abrupt process has largely bypassed these preventive measures, leaving laid-off employees vulnerable to financial desperation.
The “Ideology” aspect of MICE also looms. In the Cold War, some Western spies acted out of disillusionment with their government’s policies. When large numbers of intelligence professionals are fired without recourse or respect for their years of service, resentment can easily metastasize into ideological opposition. Adversarial states - such as China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea - are adept at scouring social media platforms like LinkedIn to identify recently unemployed individuals who once held sensitive positions. With the right approach, these regimes transform bitterness into active cooperation.
“Compromise” or “Coercion,” another MICE element, arises if foreign intelligence discovers a laid-off employee’s vulnerabilities, such as personal debt or a compromised personal life. Because the offboarding system has been so chaotic, some individuals may still have unmonitored access to sensitive systems, passwords, or physical credentials. A foreign service could dangle relief for a pressing problem - money for overdue mortgage payments, for instance - in exchange for classified data. Systemic slip-ups in deactivating accounts or retrieving key cards further exacerbate these dangers.
The final MICE factor, “Ego,” is often underestimated. Individuals who once enjoyed significant status and responsibility in the intelligence or defense community may feel humiliated by abrupt termination. Their pride, damaged by sudden job loss, can be rekindled by a foreign operative who flatters their expertise or offers them a new stage. Without structured support to ease their transition, some may see espionage as a way to regain a sense of purpose.
Beyond the immediate threats within US borders, allied relations add another layer of complexity. The US has long enjoyed a strong intelligence-sharing alliance known as the Five Eyes with the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This network depends on mutual trust and rigorous data safeguards. Allies are unlikely to maintain the same level of openness if they believe the US is mismanaging the security of critical data or neglecting the offboarding of newly unemployed personnel. A single breach in one part of the US system could expose allied operatives and resources, causing diplomatic fallout and weakening a historically robust partnership.
Rapidly shifting global conditions, including conflicts such as the one in Ukraine and the prolonged tensions with China, magnify these concerns. In times of heightened friction, intelligence collection and counterintelligence efforts intensify. An enormous pool of recently laid-off professionals with specialized knowledge is a prized target. Already, adversaries seem aware that many US agencies were ill-prepared for the scale of these cuts, allowing foreign recruiters to act before comprehensive damage assessments or security debriefings take place.
There are instructive historical precedents for federal downsizing. The so-called “Halloween Massacre” at the CIA in 1977 was notable for its smaller but still disruptive staff reduction. In the 1990s, another wave of cutbacks under President Bill Clinton was carried out more deliberately, with bipartisan cooperation and phased timelines. Despite the challenges, those earlier efforts at least aimed to ensure thorough security checks and clarity of process. By contrast, DOGE’s swift cuts have left departments - and the supporting infrastructure designed to manage separations - constantly playing catch-up.
Similar confusion has spread through other critical areas, indicating that many of these decisions are made with incomplete information or under intense time pressure to meet cost-saving targets. Efforts to challenge DOGE’s actions through oversight in Congress face an uphill battle, as lawmakers remain polarized and dedicated to a quick “efficiency” narrative. Lawsuits may shed light on the legality or wisdom of these mass firings, but any eventual resolutions will come far too late if foreign intelligence agencies have already capitalized on the chaos.
A more balanced strategy is imperative. Reducing government waste can be accomplished without compromising national security. Ideally, agency heads would be deeply involved in shaping how cuts occur, identifying true redundancies while safeguarding core missions. Properly executed, large-scale reorganizations adhere to well-established security protocols: mandatory debriefings, immediate clearance revocations, and rigorous enforcement of non-disclosure agreements. Thoroughly vetted auditors or consultants could then analyze spending while posing minimal risk to classified databases. Instead, DOGE’s “chainsaw” approach has removed entire offices and then scrambled to reverse course when it became evident those offices served indispensable functions.
Mass layoffs also have a chilling effect on the colleagues who remain. They observe the collateral damage done to peers and become more guarded, fearing sudden dismissal themselves. When morale erodes, intelligence agencies lose the collective drive and trust necessary for effective collaboration. This mistrust can hamper day-to-day operations, from cross-departmental intel sharing to rapid response in crisis scenarios.
Such an environment also undermines the synergy that has historically characterized the Five Eyes alliance. Partners may pause before contributing valuable intelligence if they suspect security lapses. They also have to worry that their own personnel or sources could be compromised once information enters the US system. In the worst-case scenario, a single infiltration of improperly offboarded employees could unravel multiple ongoing operations, not just those of the United States but of all allied participants.
Historical lessons underscore the value of a systematic approach. In the 1970s, the Intelligence Community weathered intense scrutiny from congressional committees but still found ways to maintain essential capabilities. In the 1990s, phased reductions allowed the government to track the status of laid-off employees and ensure that security obligations were fulfilled. Today’s haphazard process neglects these lessons, unleashing a wave of newly disgruntled and unemployed intelligence professionals without the usual safety nets in place. With deepening economic pressures and ballooning rents and mortgages, some may see no alternative but to sell the specialized knowledge they possess. MICE framework analysis makes it evident that such vulnerabilities are neither hypothetical nor rare; they are predictable and actively exploited by skilled foreign operatives.
A better blueprint for governmental reform would reconcile the legitimate goal of trimming redundancies with a rigorous intelligence oversight mechanism. Rather than imposing sweeping and abrupt layoffs, officials should collaborate with agency heads to inventory mission-critical roles and weigh the risks of losing seasoned professionals. Agencies must maintain or even strengthen out-processing procedures: all departing employees need robust debriefings, immediate clearance cancellations, and thorough reminders of legal obligations. External “efficiency engineers” should be granted controlled, audited access that is proportionate to their objectives. These measures significantly reduce the likelihood of intelligence leaks and sabotage.
Still, the damage from DOGE’s abrupt methods has already begun. The only question now is whether leaders will halt the current approach and implement corrective measures quickly enough to prevent further harm. Lawsuits will likely reveal more about missteps and possible legal overreach, but adversaries are not going to wait around for those findings. They are already poring over publicly available data - layoff lists, social media profiles, and government databases - searching for vulnerabilities.
The cascading effects of this disruption have consequences not just for US national security but also for global stability. Intelligence agencies worldwide operate with the knowledge that an internal breach in one service can compromise operations elsewhere. When the US, a linchpin in the NATO alliance and the broader Western security architecture, experiences such sweeping internal disorganization, adversaries stand to benefit strategically.
Ultimately, the calculus is clear: no amount of cost savings is worth facilitating espionage on a grand scale. National security requires that workforce reductions follow rigorous planning, disciplined security procedures, and a proper chain of command. Abruptly firing the very people entrusted with the nation’s deepest secrets - while granting outsiders broad access to critical systems - undermines the founding principle of the IC: to protect American interests at home and abroad. Ignoring proven CI safeguards in favor of rapid cost-cutting does little more than hand adversaries the keys to the kingdom, an error that may resonate for decades to come.
Although fiscal responsibility remains a legitimate objective, ignoring the demands of counterintelligence in downsizing efforts could be disastrous. Learning from the past, US policymakers must shift course, insisting on a transparent, deliberate process that retains essential expertise and diligently offboards those who do depart. Without these corrections, the country risks a surge in insider threats, diminished trust from close allies, and a dangerous erosion of global stability. A strong NATSEC posture can accommodate budget efficiencies - but only when guided by careful strategy and a full understanding of the MICE vulnerabilities that drive espionage. Failure to heed these warnings will have consequences far more expensive and far-reaching than any short-term savings.
